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Abstract
For cooperation to evolve via direct reciprocity, individuals must track their partners’ behavior to avoid exploitation. With
increasing size of the interaction group, however, memory becomes error prone. To decrease memory effort, people could
categorize partners into types, distinguishing cooperators and cheaters. We explored two ways in which people might
preferentially track one partner type: remember cheaters or remember the rare type in the population. We assigned
participants to one of three interaction groups which differed in the proportion of computer partners’ types (defectors rare,
equal proportion, or cooperators rare). We extended research on both hypotheses in two ways. First, participants
experienced their partners repeatedly by interacting in Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Second, we tested categorization of
partners as cooperators or defectors in memory tests after a short and long retention interval (10 min and 1 week).
Participants remembered rare partner types better than they remembered common ones at both retention intervals. We
propose that the flexibility of responding to the environment suggests an ecologically rational memory strategy in social
interactions.
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Introduction
Which do you remember better, an interaction partner who
treated you nicely or one who harmed you? Here, we investigated
which kind of partner type people remember preferentially, the
‘‘good’’ or the ‘‘bad’’.
Humans cooperate in a variety of contexts (e.g., [1]), although
cooperators risk exploitation by cheaters’ accepting but not repaying
the beneficial act. One mechanism proposed to explain cooperation
between genetically unrelated individuals is reciprocal dependence
in repeated interactions: For a cheater who will meet the exploited
partner again, the costs of future withheld cooperation by that
partner may outweigh the benefits of the current exploitation [2–3].
A prerequisite for this direct reciprocity is to identify each partner
and remember the history of interactions—an error-prone memory
would invite partners to cheat.
Although memory of the partners’ behavior is an important
building block for the emergence of cooperation [4], storing all
actions of all partners is not feasible for the boundedly rational
human mind [5]. Time (i.e., the delay until the next access to the
information in memory) causes information traces to decay [6],
and new and existing knowledge interferes with accurate recall. A
study by Stevens, Volstorf, Schooler, and Rieskamp [7] showed
that even tracking the single last action of each interaction partner,
as many of the proposed reciprocal strategies such as Tit-For-Tat
demand [8], led to high memory error rates. In an evolutionary
simulation, these errors resulted in a sharp reduction in
cooperation. So, remembering either the complete interaction
history or the single last action of each partner seem to be ruled
out as potential candidates for the memory processes underlying
cooperation. An alternative strategy could be to categorize
partners into types reflecting their general behavior, for example
‘‘cooperator’’ and ‘‘defector’’, and remember these types.
Compared to constantly updating each partners’ actions, the type
is a more stable criterion and, therefore, decreases memory effort.
Although categorizing partner types may ease memory require-
ments, the information on partner types is susceptible to forgetting,
too. Here, we investigated two hypotheses, the ‘‘cheater-memory’’
and the ‘‘rarity’’ hypothesis, that both propose to remember one
partner type preferentially and infer the other, thereby reducing
memory load. Barclay [9] and Bell, Buchner, and Musch [10] also
addressed these hypotheses, and we extended their approaches by
giving participants repeated experience with their partners and
testing memory after both a short and long retention interval.
1.1 Remember cheaters
One hypothesis predicts that, to reduce fitness costs associated
with exploitation, individuals will remember cheaters preferential-
ly. According to error management theory [11], exploitation by a
defector is worse than missing out on a cooperative opportunity.
To prevent exploitation, individuals would not only benefit from
detecting cheaters [12], but because more important information
has priority in memory than less important one [13], they would
also benefit from remembering cheaters preferentially [14]. We
term this the cheater-memory strategy.
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In an environment with a majority of cooperators, preferentially
remembering the few cheaters reduces the probability of memory
errors and related costs. Some environments, however, may
contain a majority of cheaters and here, adhering to the cheater-
memory strategy would not reduce memory load much.
1.2 Remember the rare type
The second hypothesis emphasizes the costs of memory rather
than the costs of exploitation. Individuals cope with a variety of
environments and, so, rather than always remember cheaters, they
might benefit from a memory strategy that adapts to different
contexts. Such an ecologically rational [15] strategy would
preferentially remember the less frequent partner type [9]. This
does not just reduce the amount of information to retain but also
potential memory errors. We term this the rarity strategy.
In addition to reducing memory load, focusing on the rare type
could be beneficial, because it is novel and striking. Since 1933
[16], researchers have investigated why people better remember
distinctive events. The reason, according to Hunt [17], is not an
objects’ property but the objects’ processing via increased attention
and memory. Schmidt [18] proposed the incongruity hypothesis,
which provides a combination of property- and process-explana-
tions and allows adaption to the environment. Given this
definition, one partner type may be preferentially remembered
in one context (i.e., an interaction group where it is in the
minority) but not in another (i.e., an interaction group where it is
in the majority).
1.3 Testing cheater-memory and rarity strategies
With this study, we explored two hypotheses regarding which
partner type people remember preferentially.
1. According to the cheater-memory strategy, cheaters are
remembered better than cooperators, regardless of the number
of cheaters or cooperators in the environment.
2. According to the rarity strategy, the rare partner type in an
environment is remembered better than the common one; for
example, people remember cheaters better only when these are
in the minority in the environment.
Adhering to the basic procedure of partner-type memory studies
since the seminal paper by Mealey et al. [14], we evaluated
participants’ memory of the partners by mixing the faces we had
presented to participants, the old faces, with new faces. Then, for
each face, we asked whether participants had seen it in the
beginning of the experiment (recognition; e.g., [14,19–20]). Incor-
porating Mehl and Buchner’s [21] suggestion that recognition
alone cannot be evolutionarily beneficial, because it does not allow
a sufficient partner identification, we additionally asked whether
the partner was a defector or cooperator (categorization). To test the
hypotheses, we varied the proportion of partner types in the
interaction group. This has also been done by Barclay [9] and Bell
et al. [10] who each found support for a rarity strategy. The design
of both studies, however, left open two questions that we addressed
here.
1.3.1 Does experience influence categorization? To
indicate that partners are cooperators or defectors, some
researchers provided each partner’s face with a description of
cooperative or noncooperative behavior (e.g., [14,20,22]). Barclay
and Lalumie`re [19] criticized these descriptions, as participants
could perceive the degree of cheating as higher as that of
cooperation, which could lead to a stronger encoding of the
cheaters. Moreover, we believe that behavior descriptions likely do
not have a large enough impact on participants’ behavior and
memory (see [23] concerning the importance of the perspective on
the cheater-detection mechanism in social-contract violations). In
contrast, testing partner-type memory using an economic game
(e.g., [24–25]) has two advantages. First, games avoid uncertainties
about the degree of cooperation and defection. In a Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, for example, cooperation and defection are not
indicated by example descriptions but one of two choices
(cooperate/defect) the partner takes, and these choices are
associated with a payoff matrix. Second, participants experience
the consequences of their partners’ behavior directly. Rather than
having participants evaluate whether partners with little relation to
their welfare have violated social contract or hazard management
rules, using a game affects participants immediately, because the
payoff depends on their own and the partner’s decision.
Compared to pure behavior descriptions, the strategic nature of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma likely triggers behavior and memory
processes for tracking cooperators and defectors.
Barclay [9] and Bell et al. [10] employed economic games, but
in a limited way. Barclay [9] only announced to participants what
their partners would do in a trust game that followed the memory
test. Bell et al. [10] emphasized the importance of personal
involvement for partner-type memory and let participants
experience their partners in a trust game, but it was one-shot
and gave participants just a single instance of the type of partner
they were facing. We believe it is more realistic if participants are
not just confronted with a label or a one-time experience but meet
their partners repeatedly [26]. This enables participants to infer
the partners’ types on their own and increases the recognition
accuracy, as people remember self-generated items better than
ready-made ones [27]. Repeated interactions also mimic situations
outside the lab in which remembering with whom to cooperate
and with whom not to cooperate is the prerequisite for establishing
reciprocal relationships.
1.3.2 How robust are the memory strategies to longer
retention intervals? The majority of studies on partner-type
memory tested recognition (and categorization) in a memory test
after either several minutes [9,20,22,25,28] or 1 week [14,19,24]
following the initial presentation of the partners by mixing the
familiar with new partners. We investigated whether the memory
effort associated with longer retention intervals influences the
memory strategies. Thus, we asked participants for recognition
and categorization of partners after retention intervals of both
10 min and 1 week. Though others have tested the effect of a short
and long retention interval in cheater-memory studies [21,29], no
one has done so for the rarity strategy.
In sum, to test the cheater-memory versus rarity hypothesis, we
had participants experience their computer partners’ types in
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games. We varied the proportion of
defectors and (conditional) cooperators among partners in a
between-subjects design. Then, participants answered recognition
and categorization questions in a memory test after 10 minutes
and again after 1 week.
Methods
2.1 Ethics Statement
The ethics committee of the Max Planck Institute for Human
Development approved the study. Participants signed an informed
consent before proceeding with the experiment.
2.2 Participants
Our lab recruited 126 participants (63 males, 63 females; mean
[M] age= 26, range= 18–37, median [Mdn] = 26, mode [Mo] = 25)
from the Berlin universities, 97 of which were students or in training.
Memory for Partners in Interactions
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We excluded one participant for the analysis of the second session
due to technical problems.
2.3 Stimuli and materials
For interaction partners, our design required 68 images of males
and females with neutral facial expressions (participants and
depicted volunteers were roughly of the same age). We used 58
color portraits from the database FACES ([30]; http://faces.
mpib-berlin.mpg.de/album/escidoc:57488), with the volunteers
wearing gray shirts, no make up or jewelery, sitting in front of a
dark-gray background. For the remaining 10 images, we
photographed students at the Technical University of Chemnitz
in the same way as the FACES portraits. We randomly assigned
popular German names (from the website http://www.beliebte-
vornamen.de/) to the images for each participant. To avoid
confusion about and interpretation of the faces, we informed the
participants about the neutral character of the images.
We programmed and presented the experiment with E-Prime
experimental software [31–32] (program available upon request).
Participants received a written copy of the instructions during the
experiment. The instructions contained the procedure of the
interactions, illustrated with screenshots from the program
(Document S1; original German instructions available upon
request). In explaining the interactions in the instructions, we
neither mentioned the Prisoner’s Dilemma nor the words game,
payoff, or player. Instead, we instructed participants that the aim of
the experiment was to engage in a social interaction with a partner
with whom they cannot correspond. An example illustrated this.
The participants did not know about the memory task beforehand.
As the final task, participants completed a questionnaire
(Document S2) concerning their possible strategies and other
remarks.
2.4 Procedure
The experiment involved two sessions separated by a mean of 7
days (range = 5–10 days, Mdn=7, Mo=7). The first session
consisted of five phases and took approximately 80 min; the
second session comprised four phases and lasted about 40 min.
2.4.1 Session 1. After the participants had read the written
instructions, we tested their understanding of the payoff matrix
(Table 1) in the first phase of the session. We presented them with
the four possible game outcomes (for example: ‘‘I cooperate, the
partner refuses to cooperate.’’) and asked them to indicate each
time how many points they and their partner would receive
according to the payoff matrix. They had to answer all situations
correctly to continue to the next phase; otherwise, they repeated
the phase (90 participants answered all four questions correctly
after one round, 34 after two rounds, one after three rounds, one
after six rounds).
In the second phase, participants practiced the interaction task
by experiencing a series of Prisoner’s Dilemma games in which
they chose to cooperate or defect with each partner. The
accumulated points, however, did not contribute to their final
payment. Participants experienced four interaction partners whom
they met for three interactions each (i.e., 12 encounters). Of the
interaction partners, two were defectors (one male, one female)
and two were cooperators (one male, one female). Afterwards,
participants received feedback about their success (‘‘You accom-
plished the practice session with [number] points profit. It would
have been possible to achieve 14 to 24 points.’’) and had the
possibility for a short break.
The third phase was the actual interaction task in which we
converted the payoff participants received into money. We
randomly assigned participants to three conditions (42 participants
in each condition) that differed in the proportion of partner types
among the 20 computer partners. In the ‘‘defectors-rare’’
condition, 20% of interaction partners defected, 80% cooperated.
In the ‘‘equal-proportion’’ condition, 50% defected, 50%
cooperated, and in the ‘‘cooperators-rare’’ condition, 80% of
partners defected and 20% cooperated. Each type comprised half
male and half female partners. Whereas defector partners always
defected, cooperator partners played Tit-For-Tat, which starts by
cooperating and then copies the participant’s previous action.
Implementing a strategy that reacts to the participants’ behavior
maintains attention to the partner type. If participants faced a
purely cooperative strategy, they might defect throughout to
receive the highest payoff, losing the motivation to distinguish
between the partner types. We informed participants that the
partners were not human players but pursued strategies that had
been identified in humans in experimental contexts before. They
knew about neither the number nor nature of the partners’
strategies.
In the first block of interactions, participants met each of their
20 partners once. This procedure was repeated for 10 blocks, with
a random order each time. Each encounter began with the
presentation of the partner (Figure 1). After 4 s, the next screen
asked participants to either cooperate or refuse to cooperate with
the partner, and showed a picture of the payoff matrix.
Participants had 10 s to respond; otherwise, this interaction was
skipped and they were asked to answer more quickly next time.
The subsequent screens displayed the decision of the partner for
3 s and finally gave a summary of the interaction for 2 s.
After a distraction task in which participants completed a
shortened version of an episodic memory task [33–34] in 10–
15 min, the final phase of the first session was the memory task
(Figure 1). Here, participants saw images of the 20 old partners
mixed with 20 new ones (half males, half females) and, for each
partner, had to answer three questions. The first screen presented
the partner for 4 s. Then, participants had 5 s to decide whether
they had seen the partner before (recognition). They did not
receive feedback on their success. Second, they rated the
cooperativeness of the current partner on a scale from 0 (no
cooperative actions) to 100 (always cooperative) and, third, categorized
him or her as a defector or cooperator. On the latter two questions
there was no time limit. Participants repeated this memory task for
each partner.
2.4.2 Session 2. After a mean of 7 days, participants returned
for the second session. They began by reading the written
instructions and then proceeded with the memory task. We
presented participants with the 20 old partners from the first
experimental session and 20 new partners (half males, half females)
they had not seen in any phase before. The procedure of the
memory task was the same as in the first session.
Afterwards, participants had the opportunity for a short break
and then experienced three Prisoner’s Dilemma games with 20
Table 1. The payoff for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Player’s Choice Partner’s Choice
Cooperate Refuse
Cooperate 3 ; 3 0 ; 5
Refuse 5 ; 0 1 ; 1
Note. Payoff on the left in each cell is paid to the player, on the right to the
partner.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018945.t001
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partners from the memory task. Half of these partners were old,
the other half participants had not seen before. The proportion of
types among the partners conformed to the conditions like in the
first session, and, again, each type comprised half male and half
female partners. The procedure of the interactions was the same as
in Session 1. Then, participants completed the distraction task,
and, in the final phase, they answered questions concerning their
strategies in the two sessions. Finally, participants received 5 euro
show-up fee per session. Additionally, we paid participants
according to the overall points received in the interaction task in
both sessions by multiplying their gains with 0.02, 0.03, and 0.06
euro in the defectors-rare, equal-proportion, and cooperators-rare
condition to equate the total payment across conditions
(rangeDefectors Rare = 7.98–13.40 euro; rangeEqual Proportion =
10.11–13.86 euro; rangeCooperators Rare = 9.36–19.56 euro). Al-
though participants received different numbers of points due to the
proportion of partner types in the conditions, this did not influence
the absolute number of partners correctly recognized and
categorized. Participants did not know about the different
exchange rates when making their choices and categorizations,
so this could not influence the results.
2.5 Design and data analysis
As the independent variable, we varied the proportion of
defectors and cooperators in the interaction group in a between-
subjects design (defectors rare, equal proportion, cooperators rare).
As the main dependent variables, we assessed recognition and
categorization judgments, as well as a quantitative cooperativeness
evaluation for each partner. Moreover, we collected choice data –
the participants’ proportions of defection against and cooperation
with partners – to check whether participants were able to
distinguish between the partner types. With descriptive statistics,
we present mean, standard deviation, median, and mode; for
comparisons between proportions, we give the mean with 95%
confidence interval (e.g., [35]) and Cohen’s [36] h effect size
(Cohen’s conventions: small effect size: h=0.20, medium effect
size: h=0.50, large effect size: h=0.80). If the proportions are
compared to chance performance at 50% (i.e., 0.5), we report
Cohen’s g (Cohen’s conventions: small effect size: g=0.05,
medium effect size: g=0.15, large effect size: g=0.25). When
comparing results between sessions or repetitions, we accounted
for within-subject variation by applying Morey’s [37] correction of
Cousineau’s [38] transformation for confidence intervals. To
evaluate the recognition performance, we provide Snodgrass-
Corwin-corrected d’ measurements (e.g., [39]).
We looked for the cheater-memory and rarity strategy in the
categorization accuracy in conjunction with correct recognition of
old partners, because also in everyday life one must do both—
correctly recognize and correctly categorize to sufficiently identify
a partner. In the memory research literature, this measure is called
SIM, source identification measure [40], and is calculated as the
number of correct categorizations given correct recognition over
the number of all answers (correct recognition and correct
categorization, correct recognition and incorrect categorization,
incorrect recognition) for each partner type. Because participants
make errors and guess when categorizing partners, the data
analysis should account for guessing biases [9–10,28–29]. We
calculated chance levels, that is, the accuracy achieved by
Figure 1. Example procedure of the interaction and the memory task. Screen presentation times are noted below. The original pictures were
in color.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018945.g001
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guessing, as the proportion of categorized defectors and cooper-
ators any time participants recognized a partner, whether old or
new, as old and corrected the raw accuracy rates for these chance
levels. Data are available in Table S2.
Results
3.1 Exclusion of participants
Participants who almost never cooperated experienced only
minimal cooperation by Tit-For-Tat partners and, thus, could
hardly distinguish between the partner types. From these
participants, we did not expect proper partner identification in
the memory task. We excluded 27 participants (four, 11, and 12
participants from the three conditions) who cooperated with Tit-
For-Tat partners in at most 13% of the cases. At this percentage,
there seemed to be a natural gap in the data. The next nearest
value of ‘‘percentage of cooperation with cooperator partners’’ in
the defectors-rare, equal-proportion, and cooperators-rare condi-
tion was at 18%, 27%, and 20%. All further analyses, therefore,
used only the data from the remaining 99 participants. By
excluding 27 participants, the mean proportion of cooperation
with defector and cooperator partners increased, specifically for
the equal-proportion and cooperators-rare condition. Moreover,
the mean cooperativeness evaluation of cooperator partners
increased. The categorization accuracy increased, specifically for
the equal-proportion and cooperators-rare condition. All in all,
however, by excluding the 27 participants, the results did not
change dramatically. Additionally, we excluded cooperativeness
evaluations from one participant in the defectors-rare condition in
both sessions who seemed to have misunderstood the task and
evaluated partners categorized as defectors with values around
96.2 (SD=7.4) and partners categorized as cooperators with values
of 1 (SD=0).
3.2 Cooperative behavior
3.2.1 Session 1. Participants experienced 10 Prisoner’s
Dilemma interactions with each partner. To maximize their
payoff (Table 1), participants should defect against a defector
partner and cooperate with a cooperator partner. Whereas
participants cooperated with defectors less than expected by
chance in all conditions, they cooperated with cooperators more
than expected by chance only when cooperators were common (in
the defectors-rare condition; g=0.08; Figure 2) and when both
partner types had an equal proportion (g=0.05). Yet, we found
more cooperation with cooperators than defectors in all
conditions, and participants cooperated more with cooperators
when they were common (in the defectors-rare condition;
M=58.0%67.7 CI) than when they were rare (M=48.5%67.4
CI; h=0.20; no difference between the other conditions).
We did not expect these low rates of cooperation with
cooperator partners, but the analysis across the 10 repetitions
revealed that the mean cooperative behavior increased from
40.8%65.8 CI in the first round to 71.0%64.3 CI in the tenth
round (Figure 3).
3.2.2 Session 2. Figure 2 shows participants’ cooperative
behavior, averaged across the three interactions, in the second
session after about 1 week. This time, participants cooperated both
with defectors less than expected by chance and with cooperators
more than expected by chance in all conditions (gDefectors Rare =
0.32, gEqual Proportion = 0.25, gCooperators Rare = 0.15). They seemed
to distinguish between the partner types and acted accordingly.
Consequently, the proportion of cooperation with cooperators in
the beginning of the second session (M=72.9%63.2 CI) was at
the level of the tenth repetition in the first session (M=71.0%64.3
CI; Figure 3).
3.3 Recognition
3.3.1 Session 1. In the memory task, we first asked
participants whether they had already interacted with each of 40
partners (20 old, 20 new ones). Participants recognized the 20 old
partners accurately (Mhit rate=99.1%, SD=2.5, Mdn=100,
Mo=100) and showed low false alarm rates (false alarms/[false
alarms+correct rejections]; Mfalse alarm rate=0.6%, SD=1.7,
Mdn=0, Mo=0; d’=3.8)—they distinguished between old and
new partners quite well.
3.3.2 Session 2. In the second session, participants showed
high accuracy (Mhit rate=98.3%, SD=5.1, Mdn=100, Mo=100)
and low false alarm rates (Mfalse alarm rate=0.8%, SD=3.7, Mdn=0,
Mo=0; d’=3.6), suggesting excellent recognition even after a one-
week retention interval.
Figure 2. Proportion of cooperation with defector and cooperator partners. The dashed line represents chance performance. In the
defectors-rare condition, of the 20 interaction partners 20% were defectors and 80% cooperators (Tit-For-Tat). The equal-proportion condition
included 50% defectors and 50% cooperators, and the cooperators-rare condition included 80% defectors and 20% cooperators. The ns give the
number of participants per partner type. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018945.g002
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3.4 Cooperativeness evaluation
The second question of the memory task evaluated the
cooperativeness of partners on a scale from 0 (no cooperative actions)
to 100 (always cooperative). Overall, defector partners among the old
partners received low cooperativeness values and cooperator
partners received high cooperativeness values in both sessions,
matching the strategies of the partner types (Figure 4). The larger
variability for cooperator partners in each session reflects the
reactivity of the Tit-For-Tat strategy to the participants’ behavior
(cooperator partners’ Mcooperation rate=57.2%, SD=19.9, Mdn=55,
Mo=50).
3.5 Categorization
3.5.1 Session 1. We analyzed the results of the memory task
as the accuracy of categorization in conjunction with correct
recognition of old partners. This accuracy rate, however, must be
corrected for the chance level of accuracy reached by participants’
guessing the answers. To represent the chance level, we considered
the perceived proportion of defectors and cooperators among all
partners, whether old and new, recognized as old. To correct for
chance performance, we present the simple difference between
accuracy rate and chance level, averaged across participants.
We found that, on average, defectors were remembered better
than cooperators in the defectors-rare condition (h=0.80),
cooperators remembered better than defectors in the coopera-
tors-rare condition (h=0.80), and both partner types were
remembered equally well in the equal-proportion condition
(Figure 5). This matches the predictions of the rarity hypothesis.
Analyzing the data at the individual’s level showed that this
pattern held for most of the participants: 89% of participants in the
defectors-rare condition remembered defectors better than they
remembered cooperators, 93% in the cooperators-rare condition
remembered cooperators better than they remembered defectors,
and 84% in the equal-proportion condition remembered both
partner types equally well.
3.5.2 Session 2. Correcting the accuracy rate for the chance
level per person in Session 2 resulted, on average, in defectors
being remembered better than cooperators when defectors were
rare (h=0.75), cooperators remembered better than defectors
when cooperators were rare (h=0.80), and both partner types
remembered equally well when they were equally common
(Figure 5). This was true for most participants: 92% in the
defectors-rare condition remembered defectors better than they
remembered cooperators, 93% in the cooperators-rare condition
remembered cooperators better than they remembered defectors,
and 77% in the equal-proportion condition remembered both
partner types equally well. Again in Session 2, the accuracy rate
corrected for the chance level supported the predictions of the
rarity hypothesis. Across sessions, the accuracy corrected for
chance slightly decreased for cooperator and defector partners in
all conditions.
Discussion
To explore whether people better remember cheaters or the
rare partner type, we varied the proportion of defectors and
cooperators (represented by Tit-For-Tat partners) in the interac-
tion group in a between-subjects design and tested whether a
cheater-memory or a rarity strategy matched the accuracy rates of
partner categorization in conjunction with correct recognition
better. Accounting for the perceived proportion of partner types in
each condition, in the short (after 10 min) and long run (after 1
week), participants remembered the rare partner type in the
interaction group better than they remembered the common one.
This pattern of results matches the predictions of the rarity
hypothesis.
Our study extends the work on the rarity strategy in cooperation
[9–10] by addressing two issues: the role of experience and long-
term memory retention.
4.1 Does experience influence categorization?
Rather than reading about their partners’ behavior, our
participants experienced the partner types in repeated interactions.
This way, they could form their own impressions, were personally
involved by receiving the payoffs from these interactions, and had
the opportunity to establish reciprocal relationships in a more
ecologically valid situation. Cooperation with the cooperators
increased over the course of 10 repetitions (Figure 3), confirming
that participants require the repeated interactions to become
acquainted with the partner types. This resulted in high
recognition and categorization rates (even after a week). The
recognition rates we observed are higher than those in previous
Figure 3. Proportion of cooperation across repetitions. The
figure shows the mean proportion of cooperation (695% confidence
intervals) with cooperator partners across the repeated interactions in
the first and second session. Confidence intervals are corrected to
account for within-subject variation (Morey, 2008).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018945.g003
Figure 4. Cooperativeness evaluations of defector and coop-
erator partners. Boxplots represent cooperativeness evaluations of
the partner types among old partners for both sessions. Boxplots show
the median as a line inside the box, which contains 50% of the data
(upper border = 75th percentile, lower border = 25th percentile). The
triangle represents the mean. The whiskers range from 5 to 95% of the
data, outliers are represented as diamonds. We additionally excluded
the data from one participant in the defectors-rare condition in both
sessions who seemed to have misunderstood the task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018945.g004
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studies on partner-type memory by 13–65% (Table S1).
Compared to other studies collecting categorization accuracy in
conjunction with correct recognition of old partners (Barclay,
personal communication; [20,22]), our conjunction-categorization
rates exceed the rates of these studies by 8–68% (Table S1). Some
studies reported categorization accuracy of old partners indepen-
dent of correct recognition (e.g., [9]). If we calculate this
independent categorization accuracy (Figure S1), our rates differ
by 211–50% (Table S1). Remembering the moves from repeated
interactions with partners whose strategies react to one’s own
behavior seems to be a difficult task—more difficult than
remembering one move per partner as in the previous studies.
Nevertheless, repetition pays off by allowing a stronger encoding of
partners and an accurate summary of their behavior. The
assignment of types allows individuals to ignore occasional
defections of cooperator partners, for example, as long as the
cooperator partners, in general, cooperate. This robustness
towards variance in the partner’s behavior also applies to memory
errors, which makes the assignment of types a good strategy with
high memory load. To accurately categorize partners, it seems,
repeated interactions are an important component.
4.2 How robust are the memory strategies to longer
retention intervals?
Barclay [9] and Bell et al. [10] found support for the rarity
strategy in a memory test minutes after the presentation of the
partners. We confirmed this finding and replicated the result in a
memory test 1 week after the initial presentation. So, despite this
long retention interval, participants performed similarly in the first
and second session in correctly recognizing previously seen
partners and categorizing defectors and cooperators. This is
consistent with the idea that categorizing partners into types is a
stable criterion that lasts longer than an immediate repeated
encounter. Though accuracy levels decreased slightly across the
sessions, this did not seem to interfere with the rarity strategy—
approximately the same number of participants showed a
preferential memory for the rare partner type in the first and
second session. This means that the relation between categoriza-
tion rates (in conjunction with correct recognition) and chance
levels used to correct these rates must be similar. As the chance
levels represent participants’ perception of the proportion of
partner types, one can conclude that not only is participants’
memory for partner types robust to longer retention intervals but
also their memory for the environment. Compared to other studies
collecting categorization accuracy in conjunction with correct
recognition of old partners, our conjunction-categorization rates
from the second session after 1 week exceed the rates from studies
with retention interval of several minutes by 10–47% (Table S1).
Some studies reported categorization accuracy of old partners
independent of correct recognition (e.g., [9]). If we calculate this
independent categorization accuracy (Figure S1), our rates from 1
week retention differ from the study with several minutes retention
by 28–37% (Table S1). So, our results from the long retention
interval of 1 week even mostly exceed those results from studies
with several minutes retention, emphasizing the unusual robust-
ness of our categorization results. Moreover, participants benefited
from their experience with and improved knowledge of the partner
types, indicated by a comparable proportion of cooperation with
cooperators in the beginning of the second session as in the end of
the first session (Figure 3). These findings speak to the importance
of memory as one of the prerequisites for establishing long-lasting
social interactions via reciprocity and promoting the emergence of
cooperation.
4.3 Alternative analytical methods
Additionally to addressing the two questions mentioned above,
our study, compared to previous ones, employed a different
analytical method. Would we still find a rarity effect if we analyzed
the data with previously used methods (Document S3)?
Compared to Barclay [9], our method differs in three aspects—
the accuracy rates to test the hypotheses on, the chance level for
which to account the accuracy rates, and the way how to account
for the chance level. First, whereas Barclay investigated the
cheater-memory and rarity strategy in the categorization accuracy
independent of correct recognition, we calculated the categoriza-
tion accuracy in conjunction with correct recognition of old
partners, because we consider this a necessary requirement for
partner categorization in everyday life. So, as opposed to Barclay,
our accuracy rates do not contain categorizations of old partners
falsely recognized to be new. Second, that is why, for chance level,
we did not take into account the perceived proportion of partner
types among old and new partners, like Barclay did, but the
Figure 5. Accuracy rates for defector and cooperator partners. For the depicted accuracy rates, we calculated categorization accuracy in
conjunction with correct recognition of old partners per participant, subtracted individual chance levels (i.e., the perceived proportion of partner
types among old and new partners recognized as old), and averaged across participants. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018945.g005
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perceived proportion among old and new partners recognized as
old. Third, Barclay calculated the difference between accuracy
rate and chance level relative to the individual chance levels using
[(accuracy – chance level)/chance level], but this relative
correction biases the difference score in favor of the rare type,
increasing the probability of finding a rarity effect. We subtracted
the individual chance levels from the accuracy rates to yield a less
biased measure. So, our method constitutes categorization
accuracy in conjunction with correct recognition of old partners,
a chance level of the perceived proportion of partner types among
old and new partners recognized as old, and the correction for
chance performance by taking the simple difference between
accuracy and chance level. Barclay’s method constitutes catego-
rization accuracy for old partners independent of correct
recognition, the perceived proportion of partner types among
old and new partners, and the correction for chance by taking a
relative difference. Regardless of the method applied, though, our
data always produce a rarity effect (Figure S1).
Bell et al. [10] analyzed their data with the aid of multinomial
processing tree (MPT) models. This method distinguishes
recognition, categorization, and various guessing biases [41].
Employing a model by Bayen, Murnane, and Erdfelder [42], Bell
et al. [10] found a rarity effect also in a reanalysis of Barclay’s [9]
data. Though we attempted an analysis with our data, we could
not apply the MPT method. One guessing assumption MPT
models incorporate is the categorization of new partners falsely
recognized as old, but participants in our study discriminated old
from new partners so accurately that we only had few data points
for this category in all conditions and sessions. With scarce data for
this guessing assumption, the MPT model could not produce
precise estimates for our categorization parameters. Although
scarce data distort the analysis with MPT models, this is not a
disadvantage of the study. We believe our participants discrimi-
nated old from new partners so well, because they were acquainted
with them through the repeated interactions. This large amount of
experience offers a more realistic situation compared to meeting
the partner once, like in a one-shot game. Therefore, the
proportion of new partners falsely recognized as old, alone, may
not be an appropriate guessing assumption for data with high
recognition.
4.4 Limitations
The design of our study is limited in some ways that could
potentially influence the results. First, rather than cooperating
unconditionally, our cooperator partners played Tit-For-Tat and,
therefore, were not as easily identifiable as cooperators. Frequently
defecting participants did not experience much cooperation by
cooperator partners and might not realize that these partners are
cooperators, reflected by the large variability of cooperativeness
evaluations of cooperator partners (Figure 4). Experiencing
cooperator partners as cooperative, however, is crucial for
categorizing them correctly and can otherwise decrease categori-
zation accuracy. The alternative, implementing unconditionally
cooperating partners, could have resulted in greater disadvantages.
Participants might defect with these pure cooperators, because
there are no costs of exploiting them. In effect, participants would
lose the motivation to track partner types which potentially would
have decreased categorization accuracy.
Second, whereas letting participants take part in a game
increases commitment, a Prisoner’s Dilemma game offers only a
limited model of cooperative interactions outside the lab. This
limits the generalizability of our results. First, according to the
definition by Cartwright ([43], p. 86), reciprocal altruism is time-
delayed mutualism—donor and recipient of cooperative acts
alternate in their roles so that there passes a certain amount of
time between the tit and the tat. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma we
used, however, the exchange of actions happened simultaneously
so that a participant was donor and recipient at the same time.
Thus, using a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma that enables the
alternation of the roles might have modeled the situation we
actually wanted to investigate more closely [44–45]. Second, the
setup of the game has to be chosen with care: The payoff matrix
can influence the behavior of participants [46], and using
computer instead of human partners affects participants as well
[47].
4.5 Conclusion
Our study confirms evidence of a general strategy to remember
the rare interaction partners—also in repeated encounters, over a
long retention interval, and regardless of the analytical method
applied. We reject the cheater-memory hypothesis: In this study,
cheaters are not remembered preferentially regardless of the
environment. Given that the rarity and cheater-memory hypoth-
eses make the same predictions when defectors in the interaction
group are rare, the cheater-memory strategy could be the
implementation of the rarity strategy in this kind of environment,
though. Contrary to always remembering the same partner type
(i.e., cheaters) regardless of the environment, however, the strategy
seems to be to remember the type that is rare in the respective
environment. Our findings, thereby, support the idea of a
cognitive architecture that flexibly responds to the environment
instead of specializing in certain interaction groups. By applying
the toolbox metaphor of the ‘‘fast and frugal heuristics’’ program
[48], our findings suggest that rather than using the same tool (i.e.,
remember the same partner type) in all possible environments,
participants responded in an ecologically rational way by
remembering partner types differentially depending on the
environment [15].
Moreover, our results have implications for the design of new
strategies to explain the emergence of cooperation. The traditional
reciprocal strategies such as Tit-For-Tat require remembering the
partners’ single last action and do not distinguish in memory
accuracy between defection or cooperation behavior. Stevens et al.
[7] showed that, when asked to remember the single last action,
individuals do not preferentially remember cooperation or
defection. Our results, on the other hand, indicate that memory
can differentiate between the behavior in partner types. The
combination of these findings leads the way to more realistic
strategies that store partner types instead of single actions and
distinguish in memory accuracy between defectors and coopera-
tors depending on the environment. Research on indirect
reciprocity has already produced strategies acting on the partner’s
reputation as acquired in the interactions with third parties [49–
50]. In evolutionary simulations, these strategies outcompeted
their opponents and promoted the evolution of cooperation.
In sum, repeatedly meeting interaction partners seems to
improve partner-type memory, as we found higher recognition
and categorization (dependent and independent of correct
recognition) rates compared to previous studies. This strong
encoding of partner types could explain the high accuracy rates
and the robustness of the memory strategy even after a retention
interval of 1 week. Our results suggest that the rarity of defectors
and cooperators in the environment influence how well they are
remembered. It looks as if people indeed try to minimize costs—
not the costs associated with exploitation, as suggested by the
cheater-memory hypothesis, but the costs associated with memory
errors. Of two people with whom you interacted, the cheater
might be the more important partner type to remember, but in an
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environment where cheaters represent the majority, the costs for
remembering all of them overrule the costs of exploitation.
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(TIF)
Table S1 Accuracy rates for recognition, categorization
independent of correct recognition, and categorization
in conjunction with correct recognition (with 95%
confidence intervals) from different studies investigat-
ing partner-type memory. Note. We only report partner-
memory studies that provided raw values in the paper. * We
calculated the 95% confidence interval from the standard
deviations given. { SIM=Source Identification Measure. { The
values give the range of results for studies distinguishing several
conditions or separating participants by gender.
(DOC)
Table S2 Raw data.
(XLS)
Acknowledgments
We would especially like to thank Michaela Riediger for letting us access
the FACES database and Sebastian Scholz for the additional pictures,
Gregor Caregnato for testing the participants, Henrik Olsson, Nadine
Fleischhut, Ana Sofia Morais, and the ABC research group for helpful
comments, Pat Barclay for his kind correspondence and making the
reanalysis of his data convenient, Edgar Erdfelder for his patient and
thorough support with the multinomial processing tree model, Axel
Buchner and Raoul Bell for sharing their submitted manuscript and the
results on the reanalysis of Barclay’s data, and two anonymous reviewers
for their helpful comments.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: JV JR JRS. Performed the
experiments: JV. Analyzed the data: JV JRS. Wrote the paper: JV.
References
1. Henrich J, Henrich N (2007) Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and
Evolutionary Explanation. Illustrated edition. New York: Oxford University
Press.
2. Axelrod R, Hamilton W (1981) The evolution of cooperation. Science 211:
1390–1396.
3. Trivers R (1971) The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of
Biology 46: 3–57.
4. Stevens JR, Cushman FA, Hauser MD (2005) Evolving the psychological
mechanisms for cooperation. Annu Rev Ecol Evol Syst 36: 499–518.
5. Simon HA (1956) Rational choice and the structure of the environment.
Psychological Review 63: 129–138.
6. Wixted JT, Ebbesen EB (1991) On the Form of Forgetting. Psychological
Science 2: 409–415.
7. Stevens JR, Volstorf J, Schooler LJ, Rieskamp J (2011) Forgetting Constrains the
Emergence of Cooperative Decision Strategies. Front. Psychology 1: 1–12.
8. Axelrod R (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
9. Barclay P (2008) Enhanced recognition of defectors depends on their rarity.
Cognition 107: 817–828.
10. Bell R, Buchner A, Musch J (2010) Enhanced old-new recognition and source
memory for faces of cooperators and defectors in a social-dilemma game.
Cognition 117: 261–275.
11. HaseltonMG, Buss DM (2000) Error management theory: A new perspective on biases
in cross-sex mind reading. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78: 81–91.
12. Cosmides L, Tooby J (1989) Evolutionary psychology and the generation of
culture, Part II. Case study: A computational theory of social exchange.
Ethology and Sociobiology 10: 51–97.
13. Schulz LS (1971) Effects of high-priority events on recall and recognition of
other events. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 10: 322–330.
14. Mealey L, Daood C, Krage M (1996) Enhanced memory for faces of cheaters.
Ethology and Sociobiology 17: 119–128.
15. Todd PM, Gigerenzer G (2007) Environments That Make Us Smart. Current
Directions in Psychological Science 16: 167–171.
16. Restorff H (1933) U¨ber die Wirkung von Bereichsbildungen im Spurenfeld.
Psychol Forsch 18: 299–342.
17. Hunt RR (2006) The Concept of Distinctiveness in Memory Research. In:
Hunt RR, Worthen JB, eds. Distinctiveness and Memory. New York: Oxford
University Press. pp S. 3–25.
18. Schmidt S (1991) Can we have a distinctive theory of memory? Memory and
Cognition 19: 523–542.
19. Barclay P, Lalumie`re M (2006) Do people differentially remember cheaters?
Human Nature 17: 98–113.
20. Chiappe D, Brown A, Dow B, Koontz J, Rodriguez M, et al. (2004) Cheaters are
looked at longer and remembered better than cooperators in social exchange
situations. Evolutionary Psychology 2: 108–120.
21. Mehl B, Buchner A (2008) No enhanced memory for faces of cheaters. Evolution
and Human Behavior 29: 35–41.
22. Farrelly D, Turnbull N (2009) The role of reasoning on face recognition:
detecting violations of social contract and hazard management rules.
Evolutionary Psychology 6: 523–537.
23. Gigerenzer G, Hug K (1992) Domain-specific reasoning: Social contracts,
cheating, and perspective change. Cognition 43: 127–171.
24. Oda R (1997) Biased face recognition in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.
Evolution and Human Behavior 18: 309–315.
25. Singer T, Kiebel S, Winston J, Dolan R, Frith C (2004) Brain Responses to the
Acquired Moral Status of Faces. Neuron 41: 653–662.
26. Hertwig R, Ortmann A (2001) Experimental practices in economics: A
methodological challenge for psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24:
383–403.
27. Slamecka JN, Graf P (1978) The Generation Effect: Delineation of a
Phenomenon. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and
Memory 4: 592–604.
28. Bell R, Buchner A (2009) Enhanced Source Memory for Names of Cheaters.
Evolutionary Psychology 7: 317–330.
29. Buchner A, Bell R, Mehl B, Musch J (2009) No enhanced recognition memory,
but better source memory for faces of cheaters. Evolution and Human Behavior
30: 212–224.
30. Ebner NC, Riediger M, Lindenberger U (2010) FACES–A database of facial
expressions in young, middle-aged, and older women and men: Development
and validation. Behavior Research Methods 42: 351–362.
31. Schneider W, Eschmann A, Zuccolotto A (2002) E-Prime Reference Guide.
Pittsburgh: Psychology Software Tools, Inc.
32. Schneider W, Eschmann A, Zuccolotto A (2002) E-Prime User’s Guide.
Pittsburgh: Psychology Software Tools, Inc.
33. Shing YL, Werkle-Bergner M, Li S, Lindenberger U (2008) Associative and
strategic components of episodic memory: A life-span dissociation. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General 137: 495–513.
34. Pachur T, Mata R, Schooler LJ (2009) Cognitive aging and the adaptive use of
recognition in decision making. Psychology and Aging 24: 901–915.
35. Cumming G, Fidler F, Vaux DL (2007) Error bars in experimental biology. The
Journal of Cell Biology 177: 7–11.
36. Cohen J (1977) Statistical Power Analysis for the Social Sciences. 1977 Edition
Academic Press, Inc.
37. Morey RD (2008) Confidence Intervals from Normalized Data: A correction to
Cousineau (2005). Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology 4: 61–
64.
38. Cousineau D (2005) Confidence intervals in within-subject designs: A simpler
solution to Loftus and Masson’s method. Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for
Psychology 1: 42–45.
Memory for Partners in Interactions
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e18945
39. Schooler LJ, Shiffrin RM (2005) Efficiently measuring recognition performance
with sparse data. Behavior Research Methods 37: 3–10.
40. Bro¨der A, Meiser T (2007) Measuring Source Memory. Zeitschrift fu¨r
Psychologie/Journal of Psychology 215: 52–60.
41. Batchelder WH, Riefer DM (1990) Multinomial processing models of source
monitoring. Psychological Review 97: 548–564.
42. Bayen UJ, Murnane K, Erdfelder E (1996) Source discrimination, item
detection, and multinomial models of source monitoring. Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 22: 197–215.
43. Cartwright J (2000) Evolution and human behavior: Darwinian perspectives on
human nature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
44. Frean MR (1994) The Prisoner’s Dilemma without Synchrony. Proceedings:
Biological Sciences 257: 75–79.
45. Nowak MA, Sigmund K (1994) The Alternating Prisoner’s Dilemma. Journal of
Theoretical Biology 168: 219–226.
46. Furlong EE, Opfer JE (2009) Cognitive Constraints on How Economic Rewards
Affect Cooperation. Psychological Science 20: 11–16.
47. Sanfey AG, Rilling JK, Aronson JA, Nystrom LE, Cohen JD (2003) The Neural
Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game. Science 300:
1755–1758.
48. Gigerenzer G, Todd PM (2000) Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart. New
Ed Oxford University Press.
49. Leimar O, Hammerstein P (2001) Evolution of cooperation through indirect
reciprocity. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological
Sciences 268: 745–753.
50. Roberts G (2008) Evolution of direct and indirect reciprocity. Proceedings of the
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 275: 173–179.
Memory for Partners in Interactions
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e18945
